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ABSTRACT 
 
UDOAKU CAMILLA IHENETU: A Tale of Two Countries: An Assessment of the 
EU-US Trade Relationship in Agriculture 
(Under the direction of Donald Searing and Esteban Arribas) 
 
 
 
 Although it is recognized that agriculture is not the most financially lucrative 
sector of EU and US economies, it has tremendous importance politically for these 
nations. But, agriculture is by far one of the most important features of developing 
countries economies. The US and the EU are two of the most prominent members of 
the World Trade Organization, and the WTO often relies on them to lead the charge 
towards open trade. But the inability of the EU and the US to agree on policy in 
agriculture has made the Doha Round negotiations in agriculture very difficult. This 
paper aims to show that the EU-US trade relationship in agriculture is equally 
economic as well as political, and that the fate of these rounds of WTO negotiations 
and future legislative reform in the US and the EU rely heavily on the EU and US 
ability to cooperate with each other. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 There are political forces that shape the relationships between societies in the 
multilateral trading system that is the World Trade Organization. In an age when hard 
power, or perhaps better said, military power, is of less consequence, it is apparent 
that trade negotiations are ongoing exercises of political soft power. The growing 
interconnectedness of the multilateral system makes it so. The World Trade 
Organization is the only forum for multilateral trade negotiations, and two of its most 
important players are the United States and the European Community (Union). The 
EU has a common trade policy (Common Commercial Policy), whereas for WTO 
concerns, the EU acts as one single actor. The European Commission, perhaps the 
most powerful of all the Union institutions, negotiates trade agreements and 
represents European interests on behalf of all 27 member states. All 27 countries 
claim to represent a common goal, making it an entity that holds a tremendous 
amount of clout. The United States is recognized as the most powerful nation in the 
world. Its present economic power rivals that of the EU, and it is the largest financial 
contributor to the World Trade Organization. 
Many have argued that the ongoing rounds of WTO negotiations (the Doha 
Development Rounds, 2001-present) have been the medium for a heated political and 
economic argument between the US and the EU. Both have taken the opportunity to 
flex their economic might and demand concessions while the other shouts foul play. 
 2 
The suspension of WTO negotiations in 2006 is according to many, largely due to the 
inability of the United States and the European Union to cooperate. 
The most contentious issue on the Doha Round Agenda of negotiations has been 
agriculture, although it can be argued that it is not the most important. For developed 
nations today, agriculture is not the most lucrative sector. The US and EU economies 
have evolved so that the production and the export of foodstuffs is no longer of the 
utmost importance. It is true however that at least 70 percent of the land in Europe 
can be classified as devoted to agriculture and forestry. And exporters form quite a 
formidable political lobby in both the US and the EU. Although agriculture is not the 
basis of financial stability for the US, the EU and other developed nations, it is still a 
major factor in politics, especially in nations where the route to power is through 
elections.  
Because of the political consequences, the transatlantic trade relationship in 
agriculture is a controversial one. Also because of its political importance, 
agricultural policy has received continued support, although many believe the issue 
has become obsolete. The Common Agricultural Policy in the European Union and 
the US Farm Bill are the manifestations of that longstanding support. But as many 
countries of Europe and the United States have shifted their focus from simple 
survival (after suffering the devastation of two World Wars) to seeking economic 
prominence, a shift to liberal economic policy has also taken place. 
The case for open trade has been made, and the benefits of open trade have 
shaped the rounds of WTO negotiation. The case for open trade reached the 
agricultural sector as agriculture was finally put on the WTO agenda during the 
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Uruguay Rounds (1986-1994). The widespread belief that open trade is advantageous 
has highlighted US and EU trade policy and has helped to discredit  policies that may 
perhaps go against this maxim. Each accuses the other of the most striking offenses, 
complicating multilateral negotiations and the embittered transatlantic agricultural 
trading relationship.  
This paper investigates  that complicated relationship, and in the process, reviews 
the history and character of both EU and US agricultural policy. In addition, we will 
discuss the WTO’s function in the argument, featuring the importance of the past 
round of negotiations (the Uruguay Rounds), and the role of the current Doha Rounds 
of negotiation. We hope to show that the relationship is not just economic but 
political as well. 
Also, this paper explores possible outcomes concerning negotiations in the 
agricultural sector. I acknowledge that agricultural negotiations have a “spill over 
effect”; that is, in order for countries to cooperate and come to conclusions on 
agricultural matters, concessions must be made in other sectors on the Doha agenda; 
such as, Services, Intellectual Property, and Non-Agricultural Goods. To complete the 
analysis, I will make suggestions about desirable reforms for EU and US agricultural 
policy.  
 The Doha rounds were dubbed the “development rounds” for good reason. Their 
agenda seeks to ratify changes in the multilateral trade system so that developing 
countries can now benefit, rather than just developed countries, as has been the case 
in the past. This paper will touch briefly on the position of developing countries as it 
affects the agricultural relationship between the US and the EU. In the end, I will 
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attempt to emphasize the power that each country has to shape the fortunes of the 
other and the fortune of the WTO. 
 
Method of Research 
 
With this work I hope to create a unifying framework that explores the nature of 
the transatlantic trade relationship and provides hypotheses for the future of 
transatlantic agricultural trade policy. Since this paper is primarily an analysis of the 
trade relationship in agriculture, I will first explain the concept of open trade, and the 
advantages it promises. I will focus on the work of classical economist David 
Ricardo. David Dollar and Aart Kraay will also be considered. 
This paper also details the role of the World Trade Organization in the 
multilateral trade system. Hence, I will discuss as well the objectives of the World 
Trade Organization and its own efforts at reform in order to adhere to and promote 
open trade. As was mentioned earlier, the WTO is the only entity that deals with 
multilateral trade and, with its 150 members, is the only organization that can 
effectively force the ratification of negotiated decisions in national parliaments.  
Falling in line with the belief that open trade is beneficial, and in efforts to fully 
illustrate the EU-US agricultural trade relationship, this paper will examine US and 
EU agricultural policy for its efforts to restrict the use of trade distorting policies. 
Also, the only two rounds of WTO negotiations that have featured agriculture have 
been the Uruguay rounds and the ongoing Doha rounds. Therefore the research 
examples used in this work are those that (a) correspond with that limited time period 
(1986-present) and, that (b) were influential in subsequent reforms of agricultural 
policy. 
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I will focus on a limited number of examples in order to make analysis more 
efficient. These research examples will be the 1996 and 2002 US Farm Bills and the 
1992 MacSharry, 2000 Agenda, and 2003 Fischler Reform of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy. The WTO rounds discussed will be the Uruguay Rounds (1986-
1994) and the ongoing Doha rounds. We will use this analysis of policy to describe 
and assess the contentious character of the transatlantic relationship in agriculture and 
highlight major points of debate. 
To conclude the project, I will reference my previous analysis of policy to draw 
conclusions concerning the nature of possible reforms to the US Farm Bill and the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy, and also to suggest  possible outcomes for the 
agricultural section of WTO Doha negotiations. Conclusions of the Doha round are 
especially pertinent because this year (2007) the United States is set to reform and 
renew its Farm Bill. The US relies on WTO settlements to shape Farm Bill reform. It 
is widely understood that because of agriculture’s importance to developing 
countries, the Doha negotiations are unlikely to end without agreements in that sector. 
So, one cannot stress enough the importance of agriculture for the welfare of the 
Doha rounds, and correspondingly, for the reputation of the World Trade 
Organization, the European Union and the United States. 
  
 
Chapter 2 
 
Trade and the WTO 
 
The Debate for Open Trade 
 
 The US-EU trade relationship in agriculture has in recent years been based on a 
system of open trade. The shift to a liberal economic ideology has been its driving 
force. A liberal economic ideology seeks to maximize one’s resources and benefits 
and, for this purpose, open trade is essential.  Debates about open trade have been 
long and arduous. However, most economists agree that open trade is beneficial. 
Much data show that there is a consistent statistical link between open trade and 
economic growth.1  
The classical economist, David Ricardo, demonstrated that everyone can benefit 
when goods and services are traded. His theory is founded on the principle of 
comparative advantage. The theory demonstrates that countries prosper when they 
take advantage of the assets they possess in order to concentrate on what they can 
produce best. Then trading those products for the products that other countries can 
produce best creates a relationship that is advantageous for both countries involved. It 
is irrelevant whether one country can produce all things better than other countries 
(that being absolute advantage).  
Liberal trade policies, policies that allow the flow of goods and services, “sharpen 
competition, motivate innovation, and breed success,” ensuring that consumers 
receive the best products, the best design, and the best price. The case for open or free 
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trade is also supported by the example of the surge of economic growth after the 
Second World War. Tariffs restricting trade began to fall steeply after WWII came to 
an end. The result was world economic growth that grew by an average of 5 percent 
per year. For some 25 years after the wars, the world experienced such growth. The 
causal link is believed to be liberal trade policy. World trade grew at an average rate 
of 8 percent per year during the same period.  
The evidence is clear: open trade is beneficial. The 150 countries that now 
comprise the World Trade Organization have taken that view as well. In addition, the 
WTO (2007:13) states that “all countries, even the poorest have assets-human, 
industrial, natural, financial-which they can employ to produce goods and services for 
their domestic markets or to compete overseas”. The US and the EU are obvious 
examples of country commitments to open trade. The rules that govern the customs 
union2 of the EU promote free trade in goods. The US is one of free trade’s most 
vocal supporters and has taken significant steps in the past to lower tariffs, especially 
in agriculture. Liberal economic ideology reigns in the WTO, and those who do not 
abide by the rules it sets are liable to be investigated and, if appropriate, punished. 
 
The WTO and Agriculture 
  
The WTO supports open trade and trade liberalization. Its emphasis on open trade 
also helps to shape the agricultural trade relationship between the United States and 
the European Union. There are some exceptions to the rules however, which we will 
not discuss here.3 At the core are the WTO agreements that are negotiated and signed 
by the majority of the world’s trading countries. “These documents provide the legal 
ground rules for international commerce” (WTO 2007:9).  And the US and the EU 
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are obliged to follow them. The goal is to help trade flow as freely as possible. The 
WTO’s job is to remove barriers that obstruct free trade. 
The principles of the trading system that the WTO seeks to uphold are the 
following: (1) Trade without discrimination, meaning that all countries treat each 
other equally with regard to the exchange of goods and services. There is no 
discrimination between trading partners. This is known as Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) status. Second in the discrimination vein is “national treatment,” which means 
that within a country all goods, imported and local, should be treated equally after 
foreign goods have entered the market. (2) Free trade, which means that barriers to 
trade are reduced through negotiation. (3) Predictability; through the binding of tariff 
levels, ensuring that tariff levels will not be raised arbitrarily. And in addition, there 
should be transparency or surveillance of national trade policies. (4) Promoting fair 
competition, so that trade is not distorted. (5) Encouraging development and 
economic reform. This objective is very important considering that three quarters of 
WTO members are developing countries. A sixth and less central principle of the 
WTO is its obligation to act as a dispute settling mechanism for member-nations. If 
there is a conflict regarding trade practices, members can appeal to the WTO to 
address it and seek a solution. All member countries must uphold these principles 
and, as economic leaders, the US and the EU must take the reigns and lead the charge 
for implementation of such policies. Their trade behavior is expected to reflect these 
principles.  
 Agriculture is one of the most contentious issues in all of trade.  One reason for its 
importance is its relevance to developing nations. Two-thirds of the member states of 
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the WTO are classified as developing nations. Agriculture is also important for the 
United States and the European Union. However, as of the year 2000, US agriculture 
only contributed 1.4 percent to the US Gross Domestic Product. The EU average 
(excluding Bulgaria and Romania) was less than four percent. These are small 
economic contributions. Therefore the strong focus on agriculture cannot be 
economically motivated as it is for developing nations, but rather politically 
motivated. 
The temptation for richer countries to restrict challenges from competitive imports 
is always great, and not just for domestic economic gains. Protectionism can be used 
for short term political gains as well. Protectionism forces markets to contract, which 
reduces economic activity. Such restrictions distort trade and almost always have 
negative effects. The world has regularly experienced these effects. The years of 
autarky and protectionism after the First World War are a prime example: the results 
were nothing short of catastrophic.  
Trade in agriculture is distorted “when prices are higher or lower than normal and 
if quantities produced, bought, and sold are also higher or lower than normal” (WTO 
2007:26). “Normal” is the world price in the competitive market. Governments often 
have reasons for employing trade distorting policies: assurance of enough food for the 
country’s needs; protection for farmers and rural societies, etc. However, such 
policies are expensive, and developing countries often suffer because they do not 
have sufficient resources to provide similar protection. Countries in general suffer 
because they cannot realize their economic potential and cannot provide their 
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customers with the best products available. Competition is thereby diminished and 
money is lost (“dead weight” in economic terms).   
 The WTO Doha Round of negotiations seeks to address trade distorting policies. 
As the leading exporters and importers of agriculture, the US and the EU are very 
influential in the negotiations. Three pillars of discussion are addressed in current 
WTO agricultural negotiations: market access (trade restrictions on imports), 
domestic support (subsidies and other programs that raise or insure farm prices or 
incomes) and export subsidies (methods to make exports artificially more 
competitive). The WTO allows governments to pursue agricultural policies that 
support their rural economies, but only as long as those policies are not found to 
distort trade. But while tariffs can be used to deny access to markets, domestic 
subsidies can be used to encourage overproduction, and export subsidies can be used 
to dump4 those overproduced products in other markets at prices well below the 
normal competitive prices. Under WTO regulations, policies that promote such 
actions are either not allowed or only minimally permitted. 
The Uruguay round (1986-1994) agreed on regulations that espouse “tariffs only” 
(with regard to non-tariff boundaries) policies. Before the round, imports were 
restricted by quotas and by other non-tariff boundaries such as bureaucratic red tape. 
These policies have now been replaced by tariffs in a process dubbed “tariffication”. 
When all policies had been replaced by tariffs, tariffs were then reduced and bound so 
that tariffs levels could never exceed a designated ceiling. 
Domestic support that does have a direct effect on production was cut back during 
the Uruguay rounds and “boxes” were created that categorized these types of 
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subsidies and direct payments. These boxes are based upon a sum called the AMS or 
Aggregate Measure of Support, which is a tally of how much trade distorting support 
a country or group of countries is allowed to employ. The level is set by the WTO and 
differs for developed and developing countries. According to WTO policy, the AMS 
ceiling should decline yearly until the agreed upon level is achieved. During the 
implementation period after the termination of the Uruguay rounds, developing 
countries were obligated to reduce their AMS by 13 percent and developed countries 
by 20 percent. The US cap is now 19.1 billion and the EU cap is 67 billion. 
The three boxes that distinguish the principal types of domestic support are 
labeled Amber, Green, and Blue. The “Amber box” contains policies that have a 
direct effect on production and a distorting effect on trade. These policies contribute 
directly to the aggregate measure of support. Measures and policies that have a 
minimal effect on production and trade and can be used freely are categorized as 
“Green box” policies. They include payments to farmers that encourage 
environmental safety, and payments to restructure agriculture. The “Blue box” or 
“transition box” contains practices that minimally distort policy and that are subject to 
further reform. 
There is a separate Amber box quantity that allows domestic support on a small 
scale (5 percent or less than the total value of products supported). It is called “non-
product specific de minimis” support. The US has a limit of 10 billion dollars for de 
minimus support. There is much debate as to whether a Blue box should even exist, 
since it allows trade distorting policy, albeit on a small scale. The Uruguay round also 
cut the allowed amount of export subsidies. According to most countries however, 
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(more specifically the least developed countries) these cuts were not enough. And 
ensuring the welfare of developing countries is an outstanding portion of the agenda 
of the on-going Doha rounds of negotiation (hence the name Doha Development 
Round). 
 The Doha rounds seek to reduce further the amount of trade distorting policies. 
Some even call for the complete abolition of export subsidies. One hundred percent of 
tariffs on agricultural goods are bound5 but, for many concerned observers and 
participants, that is not enough. Although the tariffs are bound, the bound rates are 
still very high. The EU bound rate for agricultural products is 15.4 percent of the 
price (value). The US average is 5.2 percent which is quite a bit lower, but does not 
reflect tariff levels on specific goods. In the EU, some rates are as high as 52.9 
percent for dairy products and 26.7 percent for animal products. In the US the rates 
are 25.0 and 2.5 percent respectively.6 
Domestic support has been lowered, but not enough from the perspectives of the 
Cairns group, the African Group, and the G-20 group.7  Therefore these countries 
have banded together within the WTO to promote the cause of the developing 
nations. Developed countries will not consent to reduce trade distorting measures 
unless concessions are made in their favor. The most prominent argument is the one 
between the United States and the EU. They have agreed in the past that the reduction 
of trade distorting policies is necessary for the benefit of all. But now, the issue is 
whether the US and the EU can fulfill the objectives that have been set for other 
nations, whether they can live up to the WTO standard of open trade. The proverbial 
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question is: when it comes to agriculture, can the EU and the US put their money 
where their mouths are? 
The tensions between the US and the EU are at the core of negotiations in 
agriculture and place a major strain on their trade relationship. They are at 
loggerheads over important details: By how much will tariffs, domestic support and 
subsidies be lowered?; When and how they will be lowered?; And what will they 
receive in return for their cooperation? The policies that each employs arouse 
suspicions in the other, and also in third party trading partners. Outsiders fear that the 
US and EU have each found ways to circumvent any new WTO conditions, as they 
have successfully done in the past; and that, instead of eliminating trade distorting 
policies, they will simply be repackaging them to fit their AMS commitments. 
The strain in the US-EU trade relationship in agriculture not only reflects poorly 
on each of them, but also on the WTO and its inability to broker deals between two of 
its most important members. It is fair to assume that neither the EU nor the US will 
leave the table or let negotiations end without some kind of concession in return for 
any policy changes on their parts. They have to satisfy their political obligations, i.e. 
their consumers, farmers, and exporters alike. And, without pressure from the WTO 
and its members, neither is likely to enact such policy changes and risk the wrath of 
the farming elite and jeopardize political outcomes. But these political imperatives in 
the United States and the European Union are alienating their trade partners and each 
other, and are rendering the trade negotiations of the WTO ineffective and inefficient. 
Conclusions for the rounds seem more and more like shifting goal posts: they get 
further and further away as time goes on. 
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1
 See the work of David Dollar and Aart Kraay (2001) 
 
2
 A customs union is an entity that has a common external tariff to all third parties and trade without 
barriers within the grouping 
 
3
 See provisions for “Special and Deferential Treatment” in the Doha Development Round Declaration 
 
4
 Dumping,  in general, is a situation of international price discrimination, where the price of a product 
when sold in the importing country is less than the price of that product in the market of the exporting 
country 
 
5
 Bound Tariffs rates are rates resulting from the World Trade Organization. It is the maximum levy a 
country can apply to a product. The applied tariff is the tariff actually levied on an imported good. 
According to the Article II of the GATT, the applied tariff should be less than the bound tariff or the 
affected country has the right to retaliate against an equivalent value of the offending country’s exports 
or they can receive direct compensation or compensation in the form reduced tariffs on other products. 
  
6
 Data from the World Bank website 
 
7
 The Cairns Group is a coalition of 19 agricultural exporting countries and has been influential in 
agricultural negotiations since its creation in 1986. The G-20 is a group of developing countries with 
special interest in agriculture and trade liberalization established in 2003. The African Group is 41 
African countries with the main interest of lowering subsidies on cotton established in 2005.  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Agricultural Policy and the EU-US Relationship 
 
Common Agricultural Policy 
 
 Unlike the United States, the EU successfully reformed its agricultural policy 
before significant decisions were made or before critical stages were reached in WTO 
negotiations. But, as WTO decisions are obligatory, previous WTO rulings are still 
influential in policy reform. The latest of these reforms came in 2003, with the so-
called Fischler reform, named after Franz Fischler, former member of the European 
Commission responsible for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries. 
The CAP was created in the 1950’s following the end of the Second World War. 
The countries of Western Europe had been devastated by this war, and the 
agricultural sector so weakened that food supplies were not secure. The CAP was 
therefore created as means to guarantee prices to farmers so that they could, in turn, 
guarantee supplies of food. The Treaty of Rome1 states that the principles of the CAP 
are the following: 
a. To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical processes by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilization of the factors of production, in particular labor; 
b. To ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earning of persons engaged in agriculture; 
c. To stabilize markets; 
 16 
d. To assure the availability of supplies; 
e. To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
Price supports in the form of subsidies were relied upon to encourage production.  
This focus on price supports created strict production-oriented subsidy policies that 
distorted world markets. The US, as a leader in the export and import of agriculture, 
was outspoken in its complaints. The CAP has been very successful in promoting 
European self sufficiency; so much so, that during the 1980’s, the EU transitioned 
from a net importer of agricultural goods to a net exporter. 
At the time of this transition, subsidies supported the increase of production and 
maintained prices above world market prices. The EU had to introduce a means to rid 
itself of its surplus goods. The remedy was a system of export subsidies. The EU used 
subsidies to sell surpluses on the world market, thereby distorting competition and 
artificially lowering world prices. In addition to using these subsidies, the EU also 
employed high import tariffs to sustain its agricultural sector. The EU stuck to these 
policies until the WTO (beginning with the Uruguay rounds) forced it to reform. The 
first significant reforms started in 1992 with the MacSharry reforms and were 
followed by the 2000 agenda reforms, and then by the most recent 2003 Fischler 
reforms. 
Market access, domestic support, and export subsidies are the focus for trade 
negotiations. The MacSharry reforms addressed market access. The WTO Uruguay 
rounds consolidated non-trade barriers (NTBs) into tariffs, and then bound tariffs 
were included in the MacSharry reform. Also featured in the MacSharry reform was 
the 30 percent decrease of the intervention price (price supports) in cereals. 
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The 2000 agenda reform was prompted by the need to prepare the CAP for the 
introduction of 10 new countries into the EU. Price supports were reduced again for 
cereal, beef and, for the first time, dairy products. The 2000 agenda also created a 
second rural development pillar of the CAP. The Fischler reforms have achieved the 
most thus far. Their notable development is the introduction of “decoupling,” a 
process that severs the link between direct farm payments and production. The 
Fischler reforms decoupled the main supports for oilseeds, cereals, proteins, beef, 
dairy and, later on, olive oil, tobacco, cotton and sugar. 
The amount of direct payments varied depending on the goods produced and 
previously, on the amounts produced. Such practices support over-production. For the 
products mentioned above, this practice has ceased. But, for other products, a high 
share of price support and coupling of direct payments to production still exists. The 
coupling of direct payments to the amount of land is still common practice. Price 
support is still the main source of farm support in the EU and is still one of the most 
inefficient and market distorting strategies. For some products, the subsidized part of 
gross farm receipts still exceeds 50 percent (European Commission Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2004:8). 
Through pressure from the WTO, the EU has taken measures to curb production 
by using set-aside policies (setting aside a certain amount of arable land that is not to 
be farmed) and production quotas2. But, for political reasons, price supports have 
been much more difficult to tackle. The farming sector in the EU still has a significant 
amount of political influence. Historic ties between farmers and social democratic 
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parties in Europe are too strong for the latter to safely neglect the former. This 
reluctance to touch the issue puts the EU at odds with its transatlantic partner.   
 To scale back intervention in the market, the Fischler reform created the Single 
Payment System which consolidates direct payments into one single payment. Then 
for some products, these single payments were decoupled (see above). This change 
was a major step in shifting EU domestic supports from the Amber box to the Green 
Box. These changes also reduced the need for production limitation instruments like 
quotas. It is however up to member states to determine how far they will decouple 
their direct payments, a fact that has also drawn attention from critics, especially the 
United States. This intergovernmental approach leaves much up to national 
interpretation. National parliaments can decide which products to decouple or to 
decouple at all. The policy does not fall in line with the spirit of “Common 
Agricultural Policy.” 
The direction of the 2003 reforms moved away from the Pillar 1 objectives of the 
CAP (commodity support focused) towards the newly created Pillar 2, which focuses 
on rural development and the environment. The reform also instituted a compulsory 
rule of cross-compliance, meaning that the amount of the direct payments that 
farmers receive will be with some respect linked to certain statutory environmental, 
food safety, animal and plant health, as well as animal welfare standards.  
Even with the changes, there has been limited success in the shift from market 
support to rural support. The EU still refuses to go further with cuts in price support 
and tariff reduction unless others will act similarly. The US is not convinced that EU 
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reform is truly focused on open trade. The US will not make what it contends are 
“unilateral” concessions unless it feels its behavior will be reciprocated. 
 
US Agricultural Policy 
 
US agricultural policy grew out the New Deal Keynesian belief that the US 
government had the responsibility for the economy’s performance. Policy makers 
also shared the belief that agricultural markets were more risky, more volatile, and 
less efficient than other markets. The nature of the market required more government 
attention. In 1933 the Agricultural Adjustment Act of the FDR administration 
initiated the first federal price supports, enforced by supply controls for basic 
commodities like wheat and corn. By 1948, the body responsible for price supports in 
agriculture (the Commodity Credit Corporation) took  the task of “stabilizing, 
supporting, and protecting farm incomes and prices, [and] of assisting the 
maintenance of balanced and adequate supplies of agricultural commodities” 
(Skogstad 1998:468). 
The 1953 US government had the clear goal of granting the agricultural sector 
special protectionist treatment and obtained a waver that excluded the agricultural 
sector from conforming to any GATT trading rules. They shielded the sector almost 
completely from the threat of foreign imports. By the 1980s the US government was 
employing support for wheat and other crops by using three key policy instruments: 
“Loan rates, deficiency payments, and supply controls. Loan rates supported prices by establishing 
a minimum floor price for each crop. Deficiency payments covered the gap between a politically 
determined target price, on the one hand, and the higher of the market price or loan rate on the 
other. Farmers’ eligibility for both loan rates and deficiency payments were conditional at various 
times on their practicing supply controls, that is taking a stipulated amount of their acreage out of 
production. In addition export subsidies were introduced at periodic intervals in the 1950’s and 
1960’s. This battery of policy instruments maintained US domestic prices well above international 
market clearing levels over sustained periods” (Skogstad 1998:469).3  
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US Farm Bills do not address import levies (tariffs) but they were also employed 
as a means to protect the agricultural sector. These policy instruments behave 
similarly to those employed by the EU. The government was the “buyer of last 
resort”. They buy agricultural surpluses and then use export subsidies to sell them on 
the international market (See figure 1 in appendix).  
 The Uruguay rounds of negotiation were the first rounds of negotiation to fully 
address agriculture. They forced the US to make changes concerning trade distorting 
policies. Reforms like the 1996 FAIR act (1996 Farm Bill) and the 2002 Farm Bill 
were the result. The FAIR Act of 1996 decoupled direct farm payments and farm 
production on a small scale. The FAIR act created the AMTA payments or 
Agricultural Market Transition Act payments that fixed direct payments on traditional 
crops only, like soybeans, wheat and corn. In addition it based these payments on 
historical records of acreage and production so that current rates of production had no 
bearing on support. It was a policy shift from distorting “Amber box” to the non-
distorting “Green box.”  The AMTA payments also allowed the government to 
relinquish its role as the buyer of last resort. 
Loan Deficiency Payments continued. The government also made loans available 
so that in the case of low world market prices, farmers could borrow money and 
stockpile their goods until prices for their commodities increased. These policies were 
only to be used in the case of a price emergency-a situation to be determined by the 
US government. The collapse in prices in 1997 and 1998 caused the distribution of 
large loan payments. The magnitude of those payments grew through most of 2002.  
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 Although major farms bills are only created every 5-7 years, the government 
enacts new policy yearly as House Ways and Means discusses the budget. In 1998 a 
new payment rate was introduced by the name of Market Loss Assistance (MLA) 
payments. MLA payments were classified as decoupled as they were paid only in 
response to low commodity prices. They are also non-specified payments because 
they can be paid to farmers regardless of the crops they grow. In 2002 the US named 
MLA payments “Green box” legislation because they were decoupled from 
production.  The MLA payments doubled each year to 2002. The FAIR act also 
authorized the use of export subsidies at Uruguay round maximums. 
 By the time the debate on the 2002 US Farm Bill began, three programs 
constituted the majority of US direct farm payments: AMTA payments, MLA 
payments (neither of which, the US claims, are tied to production) and marketing loan 
benefits that are tied directly to current production. The 2002 Bill renamed the yearly 
MLA provisions counter cyclical payments, or CCP, and were thus written into the 
Farm Bill. The 2002 Bill also authorized the voluntary updating of base acreage and 
yield. Updating changes the amount of AMTA and CCP (MLA) payments that can be 
made to farmers. The Bill also provided generous increases in support and extended 
the fixed AMTA payments for another six years. According to the 2002 Bill, farmers 
could also include historical soybean acreage to their base acreage if they could prove 
they had previously planted soybean crops. Soybean is one of the US historic 
program crops and entitles farmers to more support. 
 Such US support schemes have the European Union (and other nations as well) 
incensed over their ambiguity. These support schemes are also the EU bargaining 
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chip when the EU refuses to address the subject of lowering their own tariffs and 
domestic support practices. The EU is not convinced that 2002 US Farm Bill policy 
deserves the title of Green Box legislation, nor are they convinced that the US is 
complying with Uruguay round decisions. The EU doubts that the US adheres to the 
spirit of open trade that each WTO member nation has to observe.  
 
A Tough Relationship 
 
 The EU-US trade relationship is sensitive. Each party knows that the fortune of 
the one relies heavily on the other. They are one another’s main trading partners and 
EU-US trade is the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The importance of 
the relationship is not limited to the EU and the US. The US or the EU is the largest 
trading partner for a variety of other nations. The EU-US transatlantic relationship 
can be said to define the shape of the global economy in general. The EU-US 
relationship is so interdependent that when the one is not complying with WTO 
sanctioned rules, the consequences for the other can be disastrous. When one 
considers what is at stake at home and abroad, it is perhaps inevitable that there will 
be disputes. Each recognizes that their policies not only affect their own joint 
relationship, but affect the multilateral trading system en masse. 
The WTO is the only international body that deals directly with trade, and it is the 
medium through which the transatlantic feud takes places. Each combatant claims the 
other does not follow the WTO maxims of open trade and liberalization.  The EU’s 
major concern is that the 2002 US Farm Bill does not liberalize the agricultural 
sector, and that future Farm Bills will be equally inadequate. The EU is also worried 
about the welfare of developing countries. The US on the other hand feels that EU 
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efforts at decoupling are insufficient. The US demands more market access in 
developing countries and so refuses to make more concessions in domestic support 
unless they can be assured of cooperation on that front. Both countries are concerned 
about how, when, and by what measure to decrease tariffs, domestic support and 
export subsidies. These and other issues fuel the EU-US agricultural fire. 
 Since the US signed the 2002 Farm Bill before significant decisions were made in 
the Doha round negotiations, the US was not forced to make substantial reforms. 
According to the EU, the Farm Bill of that year was a feeble attempt to comply with 
the objectives of the WTO and the Uruguay round regulations. The MLA/CCP 
payments were first tabbed as non-specific and so allowed under the “de minimis” 
rule (and its 10 billion dollar cap). But as of 2002 the US claimed the payments were 
not tied to current levels of production and so qualified for the “Green box” of 
allowed policies and practices. They therefore do not apply directly to the designated 
AMS maximum, nor to the de minimus allotment. The EU does not agree that such 
CCP payments are completely decoupled from production. 
The CCP payments are tied to past levels of production and yield. But farmers are 
allowed to revise estimates of yield based on the probability of future upgrading. If 
farmers anticipate that more payments will be made in the future, they can plant more 
of the program crop now to build a base acreage and yield for the future (Sumner 
2003:111). The value of future payments becomes more important. One should 
question whether these payments are truly decoupled from production and whether 
they should be added directly to AMS. The EU believes the payments could and 
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should be. The EU views so-called “Green Box” CCP policies as attempts to 
manipulate the Uruguay maximums. 
The EU also debates whether AMTA payments are Green Box legislation. The 
loopholes in the AMS policy allows for these payments to be classified as “de 
minimis,” but many in the EU see this as another attempt at manipulation of the 
Uruguay round rule of Aggregate Measure of Support. The EU fears that the US can 
argue that these domestic payments “are designed to stay within the URAA limits, 
even if it does not fit within the spirit of reducing subsidies and protection” (Sumner 
2003:117). The EU fears the US will use similar tactics for the upcoming 2007 Bill. 
According to EU officials, policies such as the CCP and AMTA schemes are 
likely to hurt developing countries. Jacques Chirac noted in 2002 that “massive 
increases to [USA] farm subsidies would hurt the poorest countries hardest-including 
those in Latin America” (Sumner 2003:109). The EU prides itself on its commitment 
to aiding developing countries in their quest to make themselves viable on the world 
market. The EU leads all other countries in this capacity. Poorer countries like the 
less developed countries of Africa and Latin America enjoy duty-free access to the 
EU market under the Everything But Arms Initiative. The Initiative enables these 
countries to sell their products at the higher EU internal prices (which are a product of 
price supports), but without incurring the levies that other countries face.4 
 The EU (and others) argues that the US has taken advantage of loopholes in WTO 
regulation. The US has shirked its responsibility to uphold WTO objectives with its 
2002 Farm Bill. According to the EU, because of the US inattention to detail, the US 
has forfeited its ability to negotiate for more market access or lower subsidies in other 
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countries. The US neglected its role in the promotion of trade liberalization and so 
therefore has no “right” to demand similar concessions of other WTO members, 
especially the EU. The Financial Times of London said it best: “with its new, 
grotesque farm subsidies, the US has let the European Union off the hook. Trade 
liberalization was supposed to be one of the disciplines that would push the EU to 
reform its absurd Common Agricultural Policy. But having surrendered to 
protectionism, Washington is in no position to fight” (Sumner 2003:120).  The EU is 
not likely to heed the complaints from Washington when it feels the US has done the 
multilateral trading system as disservice. 
 The US has some complaints of its own. The EU has made it very clear to the 
world community that in the last Fischler reforms it has decoupled its direct payments 
and domestic support from production; in the press however, they never elaborate on 
how many products payments have been decoupled. For a great many of EU 
agricultural products, policies of price support still exist, as do domestic supports 
based on production (data on how many products was not readily available). The 
US claims that the level of decoupling is lacking. 
The EU has also claimed that it has made great strides in shifting its payments 
from the trade distorting Pillar One to the rural development and environmental 
protecting Pillar Two-in other words, a change from the Amber Box to the Green 
Box. The EU pays its producers to uphold standards of food production, animal 
treatment, and food quality. They have created a labeling system5 so that their 
consumers are assured of the quality of their food. The US has labeled these attempts 
as a masked form of protectionism, and has charged that the EU uses these policies to 
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deny US goods access to the EU market. Developing country markets are similarly 
closed to US products. Both the EU and developing countries have “special products” 
that are sheltered by high agricultural tariffs. These sensitive products are also exempt 
from full tariff cuts. According to the US these policies run afoul of the WTO 
commitment to increase market access in agriculture. 
 Both the United States and the European Union take issue with each other for 
inabilities to agree about the amount, the time, and in what fashion tariffs, subsidies, 
and domestic support will be decreased. By what amount to lower (or if at all) the 
maximum of the Aggregate Measure of Support is also a contentious issue. The 
classification of agricultural policy in ambiguous boxes is also a source of great 
contention between the US and the EU. These are just a few of the issues that cause 
tension in the EU-US trade relationship. There are of course more specific, 
commodity based and dispute settlement issues that we have not had time to discuss 
here. The tension directly affects the multilateral trading system because of the 
important role both the EU and the US play in global trade. The tension also reflects 
poorly on the WTO, for as the only international body that addresses global trade, the 
world looks to it to manage trade disputes. In the eyes of many the WTO has been 
less than successful at fostering better transatlantic trade relations and making 
progress in the Doha rounds of negotiation. As much as the WTO appears to be an 
entity dedicated to economy and trade, the WTO is a political body responsible for 
negotiating and bargaining on the global scale.  
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1
 Treaty signed by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations on March 25, 1957 that established 
the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the European Union of today. 
 
2
 However quotas can in fact have a counter effect as they raise domestic prices and can often cause 
larger surpluses 
 
3
 Loan deficiency payments are output subsidies, the rate of payment is the amount by which the 
applicable county’s loan rate exceeds the marketing loan repayment rate. 
 
4
 This duty –free access is allowed under the WTO Framework for Special and Differential Treatment 
for Least Developed Countries. 
 
5
 Labels for Protected Designations of Origin, Protected Geographical Indications and Traditional 
Specialty Guaranteed. According to the European Commission these labels offer guarantees about 
origin and method of production, the value of the product, and protect against unfair imitation 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Conclusions 
 
Possible Conclusions for the Doha Rounds 
 
 The conflict between two of the most influential members of the World Trade 
Organization makes negotiations quite difficult. The position of each directly affects 
the position of the other with respect to policy, and also directly affects the path of 
WTO negotiations. The reputation of the WTO as a mediator is at stake. The 
suspension of the Doha round in 2006 is an example of the power the US-EU 
relationship has to shape the course of negotiations. Here I will discuss issues and 
possible conclusions to the Doha Rounds of negotiations. I will keep in mind the 
“spill over” effect of negotiations. The Doha conclusions will also affect national 
policy, so I will discuss potential reforms for the US Farm Bill and the Common 
Agricultural Policy since the one will correspond with the other. The EU-US 
relationship is an exercise in give and take. One must give to get. 
 There are four keys to the Doha Agenda: (a) cuts in overall support; (b) cuts in the 
maximum AMS values; (c) reductions in de minimus levels; and (d) the Blue Box 
ceiling should be lowered to 5 (perhaps 2.5) percent of the value of agricultural 
production. In 2004, the then 147 members unanimously agreed on a framework for 
modalities on how to liberalize farm trade. Modalities are the rules (or amendments to 
existing rules) and numerical targets needed to meet the Doha Round Agenda. After 
countries agree to the modalities, work commences on creating schedules for the 
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changes. Each member nation submits detailed offers that they must adhere to when 
WTO decisions have been made. But the modalities do not give explicit formulas to 
be used; they do not include the figures that will eventually be used; nor do they 
determine how much reform is to be achieved. 
 In 2005, the sixth Ministerial Conference proposed some resolutions. Export 
subsidies were to be phased out by the year 2013 with conditions on export credits 
and food aid (measures used primarily by the US). In regards to domestic support, the 
WTO wants to force reform of the US CCP policies, and create three bands for 
reduction in domestic support overall, with higher cuts in the highest subsidy bands. 
For market access, the system for tariff cuts is a four band scheme. The highest tariffs 
will suffer the highest cuts. Finally, for those countries in a position to do so, they 
should provide duty free access and quota free market access for products from Least 
Developed Countries. 
According to the WTO website, the Doha mandate “underscores the ‘level of 
ambition’…For example phrases such as ‘substantial reductions’ and ‘substantial 
improvements’ are used repeatedly; and throughout there are references to ‘special 
and differential treatment’ for developing countries being ‘integral’ ” (WTO 
2004:17). The three pillars (market access, domestic support and export subsidies) are 
always mentioned as being interconnected, and improvements concerning them must 
take place equitably. The Doha mandate does also include references to market access 
for other non-agricultural products, an issue which may be integral for agricultural 
negotiations to be laid to rest. Developed countries (especially the EU) are not willing 
to agree unless concessions are made with regard to Intellectual Property (TRIPS), 
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Non-Agricultural Market Access  (or NAMA which includes industrial products or 
manufactured goods), and Services. 
The United States, aside from the faults in the 2002 Farm Bill, still proposes 
massive restructuring of the multilateral tariff and subsidy scheme. The US proposes 
the top tier of bound tariffs be cut by 90 percent, with the average cuts hovering at 75 
percent. The EU is in agreement that tariff rates should be cut, but at a less ambitious 
rate-60 percent for the highest bound tariffs with an average cut of 46 percent. These 
proposals have put the EU and US at odds.  
In a bid to support developing countries, the EU has proposed that developing  
countries be allowed to designate up to 8 percent of imports as “sensitive” and 
therefore not subject to the cuts. The US on the other hand proposes that exemptions 
should be limited to just 1 percent of imports. The US favors higher reductions 
because it fears that inadequate cuts in bound tariffs will not influence applied tariffs. 
The US has even gone so far as to suggest attacking applied tariffs directly. It does 
not favor giving more specialized treatment to developing countries, because the US 
feels it has already fulfilled that obligation under the Framework Agreement.1 The US 
expects more concessions in tariffs from the EU (Japan and others for that matter) 
before it will agree to any further “special and differential” treatment. 
The precise means to reduce the tariffs is under debate. There are several 
proposals: the Swiss Formula for reduction, which produces much steeper cuts on 
higher tariffs; the Uruguay Round approach, which uses the same percentage of 
reductions no matter the starting tariff rate; ad valorem uses a percentage of the price; 
or specific tariff rates for each product. The time period for implementation of 
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reductions is in question. Lastly, whether all developed countries should allow duty-
free access to developing countries is contested. The sixth ministerial conference 
proposed it, but it is still unknown who will accept such sweeping regulation. 
 Provisions will also be made for food safety. Member countries (especially the 
EU) are very much against the WTO forcing them to accept food imports they deem 
unsafe, or goods that harm animals in their production. There are new concerns about 
genetically modified organisms and disease outbreaks and the use of these concerns 
as a means of protection. Some like the US are already concerned that sanitary and 
photo sanitary regulations (SPS) are replacing tariffs in that capacity.  
 Also, there is the debate surrounding the “boxes” of domestic support. There are 
proposals that support the removal of the “de minimis” provision and the inclusion of 
all its policies in the Amber box. They would then contribute directly to the 
Aggregate Measure of Support. To add, the same is proposed for the Blue box: its 
destruction and those policies that directly distort trade added to the Amber box and 
those which do not, to the Green box. 
 With regard to possible conclusions, if we revisit all that is above, it is quite clear 
that fulfilling all of the objectives of the Doha Agenda will be quite difficult to 
execute. Concerning tariffs, the EU is also very easy with its declaration that the US 
does not enjoy a very strong bargaining position. Its 2002 Farm Bill has left much 
wanting and so allows the EU and the developing countries to take more liberties. 
The US proposal for sweeping tariff cuts does not seem plausible. The EU will not 
agree to such extensive cuts unless their “sensitive products” can be adequately 
sheltered. The US will not agree to their own proposals to lower their tariffs further 
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unless developing nations agree to more market access for industrial products 
(NAMA) and services; nor will the US agree if the EU continues to shelter its 
products. No side is willing to budge on the point, especially now that developing 
countries have joined together in the matter. Marked tariffs reductions in these rounds 
of negotiation do not seem likely. 
 With regard to domestic subsidies, for political reason the US has shown how 
reluctant it is to decrease its domestic subsidies (however willing they are to 
restructure them). Before it will do so, the US must be assured of securing more 
market access in agriculture from the EU and developing countries. The fear of 
environmental policy as a form of protection has already incensed Washington. The 
US needs more in return if it is going to persuade its own farmers to give up their 
safeguards. The US is not prepared in any way to act unilaterally. There must be give 
and take. 
 I agree with Arvind Panagariya (2005:5-6) when he proposes that there are two 
possible conclusions. The first is an agreement on the complete destruction of export 
subsidies. Export subsidies have been the subject of much negative publicity over the 
last two decades. An agreement to terminate them would be a watershed decision for 
the WTO and is sure to be seen as acceptable to all countries. The US will have to 
eliminate (or a least come close to eliminating) export credits and food aid, as they 
are also considered a form of subsidy. The current world level of export subsidies is 
between 3 and 5 billion dollars a year. Their elimination would not be such a drastic 
change for the countries that employ them. Food aid is important for some developing 
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nations, but provisions would be made to secure that those countries that need food 
aid the most would receive it. 
The second of these possibilities regards the domestic subsidy boxes. Eliminating 
the Blue box and the de minimis provision could jar domestic policy, but it would 
also give the WTO a clean slate in the subsidy regime. The WTO could make the 
definition of the boxes more concrete and leave less room to interpretation. Clarity 
and transparency are also sure to be acceptable, especially in so-called liberal 
democratic nations. With regard to a schedule for tariff reductions, nothing is 
impossible. But I believe that the level of reductions will correspond closely to the 
amount the market in Services and other sectors opens. However, I do not believe that 
significant decisions will be made in tariffs during this round of negotiations. 
 These possible conclusions leave much wanting with regard to other sectors. In 
my opinion, not much headway will be made in other sectors like NAMA and 
Services. It is hard to leapfrog over agriculture, a sector of the economy that is 
specifically important to developing nations. But if the US and the EU can cooperate 
on the elimination of export subsidies and the clarification of the domestic subsidy 
boxes, perhaps the door to negotiation in other sectors will open further and more 
could be achieved in the next round of negotiations. It is true that rounds of 
negotiation take place only every 10-12 years, but the above concessions could help 
soften the transatlantic relationship and could help preserve the reputation of the 
WTO. All can benefit if they decide to cooperate.  
 
Future for US Agricultural Policy and the CAP 
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 Because it is very unlikely that WTO negotiations will end this year, or even that 
substantial decisions will be made, it is also very unlikely that substantial changes 
will be made to the 2007 US Farm Bill. The US does however rely on past and on-
going negotiations to help shape new Farm Bill regulations. US regulations must 
comply with regulations or limitations set forth by the World Trade Organization. But 
without international guidelines to follow, the US isn’t so much a body without a 
head but a body without a conscience. There is no external body to monitor reform. 
And tariff legislation is not a feature of Farm Bill policy. 
Farm Bill policy is not a process determined solely by the White House executive. 
The US Trade Representative does report to the president, and she (Susan C. Schwab) 
did enjoy Fast Track Authority2. However, now that Fast Track Authority has 
expired, congressional proceedings will prolong negotiations. It has been argued that 
renewing Fast Track Authority in the US was essential for the Doha rounds to end. 
Policy creation is the product of compromise involving Congress, the Administration, 
and key interest and lobbying groups. Fast Track Authority was controversial but it 
“trimmed the fat” on legislative procedures. Without it, the US seems that much less 
likely to agree on any Doha proposal in a timely fashion. The 2007 US Farm Bill was 
to be shaped by the outcome of Doha negotiations, but that is now nearly impossible. 
US policy in agriculture has been the subject of much internal criticism. 
Government assistance disproportionately aids larger farms. The largest 10 percent of 
farms receive more than half of the total payments (Blandford 2007:21). Farmers are 
very vocal about equity in payments and this may force Congress to back policies that 
benefit the smaller farmer. The focus on the environment and the protection of 
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wildlife habitat could also impact Congress. Interest groups pressing for funding on 
environmental programs, a la Europe, could be rewarded in 2007. But pressure to 
reduce the deficit and curb government spending could make things more difficult. 
The fact is that the president owes his second term to farm state electors, and the 2002 
Republican sweep of elections is still fresh in the minds of the farming sector. The 
2006 Democratic sweep of Congressional elections shook things up, but the power of 
the farming elite is not far from their minds either.  
Therefore for largely political reasons, it is unlikely that there will be a major shift 
from domestic support in the 2007 Farm Bill. The current focus on environmental 
issues is great but the need to curb government spending may be greater. It is even 
more unlikely that environmental issues will receive support at the expense of 
domestic support considering the Bush administration has continued to downplay the 
issue of global warming. The 2005 WTO rulings in the Brazil-US cotton case could 
prompt the US to make changes in domestic support. It is acknowledged that US 
trade-distorting domestic policy ranks near the top of world values (along with the 
EU and Japan). But, the farm lobby is just as strong as it has even been. 
If a WTO decision could be made in 2007, it would force the 2007 Farm Bill to 
make restrictions accordingly. But as WTO conclusions this year are unlikely, so are 
significant changes in the US Farm Bill. If the US does not make changes to comply 
with WTO cotton case rulings, and/or decrease domestic support, the EU will not be 
compelled to do so either. US compliance is almost directly linked to more market 
access in agriculture, NAMA, and Services in developing countries. In addition, the 
WTO reputation as a dispute settlement mechanism is still in jeopardy.  
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 CAP reform does happen to take place outside of WTO negotiations. The EU 
does make a large show of making progress towards liberalization “without WTO 
interference.” The CAP reforms that took place in 2003 are set to be in place until 
2013. With regard to reforms beyond 2013, it is a bit more difficult to predict. There 
will however be a 2009 EU budget debate which could make the policy scope more 
limited. The green movement in the European Union is very real. Continued efforts to 
shift from Pillar I to Pillar II will continue. According to Allan Buckwell “there is no 
doubt that in the case of Europe, with its high proportion of land under farming, 
forestry or nature management, with the extent of trans-boundary environmental 
spillovers, and EU-based environmental, animal welfare and food safety regulation 
within its single market, a significant case can be made for its rural land policies” 
(Buckwell 2007:17). 
The EU will undoubtedly examine its policies in the future and decide whether 
coupled direct payments are such an important feature and whether policies of cross-
compliance should not extend to all products. Until 2013 however, the Single 
Payment System will account for the major part of CAP expenditure. But member-
states like the UK are proposing their total elimination by the year 2020. Nonetheless 
one can successfully conclude that the EU will not take steps in the future to reduce 
domestic support or increase market access for “special products” unless they have 
some assurance that other powerful nations like the United States will follow suit. 
And without pressure from the WTO, the EU is not likely to receive such assurances. 
The US has showed itself to be very difficult when it comes to protection of farmers. 
Negotiations are likely to stall again. The reputations of the US and the EU as leaders 
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in the effort to liberalize are at stake, but it appears that the transatlantic trade 
relationship in agriculture will continue to be controversial and every bit as political 
as it has been.  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
                                                                                                                                                 
1
 See WTO August 2004 Framework 
 
2
 Fast Track Negotiating Authority or Trade Promotion Authority is the president’s ability to negotiate 
trade agreements that the Congress can approve or disapprove but cannot amend or filibuster. It 
expired on July 1, 2007. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1. Price Support 
Source. http://www.tutor2u.net/economics/content/diagrams/bufferstocks1.gif 
 
The above figure describes how price supports work. The graph represents the 
market for a particular good. S1 and S2 are representations of supply of a good that is 
produced by a farmer. Both are completely elastic as the farmer cannot change the 
quantity of the good supplied to the market after he has harvested for the season. 
Pmin and Pmax are the minimum and maximum price that the government will allow 
for the good. Demand is represented by the two downward sloping lines. 
If for a given year, the supply of the good is S1 and demand remains constant, 
then the price will fall below the minimum. To raise the domestic price of a good 
above the minimum, the government in this case will buy however much of the 
product necessary to raise the price. The demand shifts from the solid line to the 
dotted line and back within the designated price band. If for another given year, 
supply of the good is S2 and demand is constant, then the price goes above the 
maximum. The government will sell whatever goods it has in its reserves to lower the 
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price back into the necessary price band. Demand again shifts from the solid line to 
the dotted line. The government also employs export subsidies to sell whatever 
surpluses it has purchased from the domestic market onto the world market at lower 
prices, therefore distorting not only prices in the domestic market, but in the world 
market. 
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